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Purpose- The purpose of this study is to examine the role of reducing information asymmetry 
(IA) on conditional financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-
2011. 
 
Design/methodology/approach- The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-
contemporary quantile regressions. Instruments for reducing IA include pubic credit registries 
(PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector 
development are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization, 
semi-formalization and non-formalization. 
 
Findings- The following findings are established. First, the positive (negative) effect of 
information sharing offices (ISO) on formal (informal) financial development is consistent with 
theory. Second, ISOs consistently increase: (i) formal financial development, with the incidence 
of PCRs higher in terms of magnitude and (ii) financial sector formalization, with the impact of 
PCBs higher for the most part. Third, only PCBs significantly decrease informal financial 
development and both ISOs decrease financial sector informalization. Policy implications are 
discussed.  
 
Originality/value- The study assesses the effect of reducing information asymmetry on financial 
development when existing levels of it matter because current studies based on mean values of 
financial development provide blanket policy implications which are unlikely to be effective 
unless they are contingent on prevailing levels of financial development and tailored differently 
across countries with high, intermediate and low initial levels of financial development.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55 







1. Introduction  
 Three main factors motivate this inquiry. They are: (i) shortcomings in the literature on 
information asymmetry, (ii) employment of hitherto unexplored concepts of financial sector 
development in the literature and (iii) recommendations for more scholarly inquiries into the 
relevance of reducing information asymmetry in the African financial industry (Singh et al., 
2009, p. 13), partly because of excess liquidity issues.  
 There is a consensus in the literature that African financial institutions are characterised 
by substantial surplus liquidity concerns (Fouda, 2009; Asongu et al., 2016a; Saxegaard, 2006). 
Attempts have been made to address this policy syndrome by introducing information sharing 
offices (ISOs)1 in the continent over the past decade (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). Accordingly, the 
principal objective of ISOs within the frameworks of public credit registries (PCRs) and private 
credit bureaus (PCBs) has been to increase financial allocation efficiency by mitigating the 
prevailing asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers. The reduction of 
information asymmetry (IA) is centred on factors that constrain access to finance like: physical 
access, eligibility to bank lending and affordability (see Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Allen et al., 
2011).  
 In the light of the above, the role played by ISOs in the financial industry is similar to that 
of brokers between borrowers and lenders. They help in the: reduction of credit constraints, 
improving the efficient allocation of capital and enhancement of financial sector importance in 
the banking industry (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). This inquiry is concerned with the third 
advantage, notably the role of reducing information asymmetry in financial sector development. 
It is partially motivated by recent African literature on information sharing which has concluded 
that ISOs may not be improving financial access through enhanced financial sector importance 
within the industry (Asongu et al., 2016b). The narrative further maintains that it is very likely 
that ISOs are being employed by powerful banks in the continent to enjoy a ‘quiet life’2.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this inquiry, ‘PCB and PCR’ are employed interchangeably with ISO.  
2
  According to Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), ‘quiet life’ is derived from the ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’ (QLH). It 
is based on the assumption that powerful banks would abuse their power by using their privileged positions to 
increase their profit margins instead of pursuing the goal of increasing financial access and financial intermediation 
efficiency (Also see Banya & Biekpe, 2017).  For example, Banya and Biekpe (2017) have recently shown that bank 
size is negatively associated with banking sector efficiency, partly owing to low competition in the banking sector 
which decreases financial intermediation efficiency (Biekpe, 2011). 
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 To the best of our knowledge, the information asymmetry literature has failed to directly 
and critically involve the dimension of financial sector importance in financial development (see 
Tanjung et al., 2010; Houston et al., 2010; Ivashina, 2009). The reason for this neglected 
dimension may be traceable to the fact that data on ISOs is only available from 2004. 
Furthermore, the substantial bulk of the literature has viewed interbank development in the 
perspective of bank participation and bank concentration (O’Toole, 2014; Asongu, 2015a). This 
study steers clear of this strand of literature by conceiving financial sector development in the 
light of financialization. Whereas a bulk of the literature has assessed the link between financial 
access and reforms in the financial sector (Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010), the 
present investigation complements the strand of literature on financial reforms by introducing (i) 
a previously missing aspect of the informal financial sector into the financial system definition 
and (ii) the concept of financialization.  
 The introduction of the notion of financialization unites two strands of research  in two 
key ways.  (i) It responds to a growing field of economic development by including  
microfinance and other forms of informal finance and (ii) It contributes to the stream of studies 
on the measurement of financial development. In addition, the paper suggests a pragmatic means 
of disentangling the effect of decreasing IA on various components of the financial sector. Thus, 
the study looks at hitherto unexplored financial sector concepts, namely: formalization, semi-
formalization, informalization and non-formalization.  
 Despite severe issues of financial access in African financial institutions, previous studies 
on IA have not given the continent its diserved attention (see Asongu et al., 2016a). The 
scholarly emphasis on the region has been limited to selected countries and  the scope of 
financial sector development. Barth et al. (2009) focused on nine African countries, Love and 
Mylenko (2003) investigated four while Galindo and Miller (2001) assessed none. In more 
contemporary literature, 42 countries have been investigated by Triki and Gajigo (2014) for the 
period 2006-2009 whereas Asongu et al. (2016a, 2016b) have examined 53 countries for the 
period 2004-2011. The positioning of this inquiry more closely aligns it with the last-three 
studies in terms of sample and periodicity. However, this study steers clear of the highlighted 
stream (which has focused on financial access) by investigating the relationship between 
reducing IA and financial sector development. The investigation also accounts for initial levels 
of financial sector development. 
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 The study accounts for existing financial sector development levels by arguing that 
blanket policies on the role of ISOs on financial sector development may be ineffective unless 
they are contingent on initial levels of financial sector development and tailored differently 
across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial sector development. This 
entails the use of the quantile regressions  in the analysis of the relationship between ISO and 
financial development. The connection is assessed throughout the conditional distributions of 
financial sector development. This approach substantially steers clear of the highlighted 
literature which is based on mean values of financial development, notably Asongu et al. (2016b) 
and Triki and Gajigo (2014) who have respectively employed Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) and Probit models.  
 The remainder of the study is organised in the following manner. Section 2 covers the 
theoretical underpinnings, proposes measurements of financial sector development and reviews 
the relevant IA literature. The data and methodology are described in Section 3. The empirical 
results and policy implications are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with future 
research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical Underpinnings, Propositions and Related Literature  
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings and Propositions  
 According to Claus and Grimes (2003), two main perspectives dominate the theoretical 
foundations of the relationship between reducing IA and financial development. The first view is 
oriented towards the transformation of risk characteristics of bank assets while the second 
focuses on channels through which financial access can be enhanced. Moreover, the two 
viewpoints accord with the fundamental role of banks in intermediation efficiency which is to 
convert mobilised deposits into credit for economic agents. The perception also broadly aligns 
with foremost theoretical literature on the relevance of information sharing in financial access, 
namely, on: financial institutions’ communication of potential borrowers to investors (Leland & 
Pyle, 1977), ex-post and ex-ante IA (Diamond & Dybyig, 1983), financial intermediary 
diversification (Diamond, 1984) and models of credit rationing (Williamson, 1986; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981; Jaffee & Russell, 1976). 
 Recent African IA literature that builds on the engaged theoretical underpinnings has 
failed to either include the informal financial sector and/or financial sector development (Singh 
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et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016a, 2016b).  We complement the literature 
here by also addressing a missing element in the definition of the financial system by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2008) where the  
definition has failed to incorporate the informal financial sector. This neglect starkly contrasts 
with the substantially documented importance of the informal sector in development outcomes in 
developing countries (see Aryeetey, 2005; Adeusi et al., 2012; Meagher, 2013). 
The propositions in Table 1 which rethink the IMF financial system definition (i) 
incorporate the informal financial sector and (ii) articulate measures of financial sector 
importance that have not been substantially included in the financial development literature 
(Asongu, 2014a, 2015ab). While Panel A discloses measures of financial sector importance in 
relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), indicators in Panel B are oriented towards 
competition for shares in the money supply (M2) within the financial sector.   
 The articulation of competition within the financial sector is founded on the concepts of 
formalization, semi-formalization, informalization and non-formalization. For instance, whereas 
financial formalization discloses the growth of the formal financial sector in money supply, such 
progress is simultaneously to the detriment of competing financial sectors, namely semi-formal 
and informal financial sectors. The suggested measures of financial sector development improve 
the mainstream narrative in three principal dimensions, notably in: (i) providing a definition of 
the financial system that includes the informal financial sector, (ii) disentangling the existing 
IMF definition into its formal and semi-formal components and (iii) introducing the notion of 

















Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits3  here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits4 are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 








(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)5 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalization)6. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)7. 




(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ 
financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 8 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector 
importance. Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one 
sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  







                                                          
3
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
4
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
5
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in 
undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking 
system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in 
circulation” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
6
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
7
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of 
formal and semi-formal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432).  
8
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, 
meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal 
sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation”  (Asongu, 
2015a, p. 432).  
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2.2 Related literature  
 
 In line with recent IA literature (Asongu et al., 2016a), two main strands have dominated 
inquiries into the outcomes of reducing IA: the effect of IA among creditors and how enhanced 
channels of reducing IA are affected by creditors’ rights. One aspect is oriented towards 
assessing how information sharing affects antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012), influences 
corruption-motivated lending (Barth et al., 2009), mitigates credit cost (Brown et al., 2009), 
affects syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010), reduces default rates 
(Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) and increases access to finance (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2015). The other strand focuses on the importance of 
enhanced creditors’ rights in bankruptcy on the one hand (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov 
et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009)  and the ability to take risk by financial institutions on the 
other (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011).  
 A substantial bulk of the literature has been devoted to regions where concerns about 
surplus liquidity in financial institutions are comparatively less severe.  Most of these previous 
studies  focused on developing countries in Latin America and Asia on the one hand and 
countries in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the other. 
Noticeably, Africa which is an area with more acute constraints  in financial access has not been 
given the much needed scholarly attention (Asongu et al., 2016a).  
 Galindo and Miller (2001) considered the difficulties surrounding the  reduction of IA in 
financial access. They established that relative to developed countries, developing nations with 
ISOs enjoy fewer restrictions on access to finance. According to the authors, performing PCRs 
substantially  limits the responsiveness of  institutions to financial controls (proxied with 
decisions on ‘cash flow’ investment’). Love and Mylenko (2000) have used corporate-related 
information from the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) and a combination of 
public and private credit offices to examine whether  a negative connection between credit 
registries and limitations in financial access is allied with a perception of a decreasing IA by 
bank managers. They concluded that while PCRs do not considerably reduce constraints in 
finance, PCBs are associated with higher levels of access to finance. Barth et al. (2009) 
examined how ISOs reduce IA and the influence of lending competition on ‘corrupt lending’ to 
establish two main findings.  (i) lending linked to corruption is decreased by competition in the 
banking industry and (ii) decreasing IA plays a core role in the negative relationship. ‘Corrupt 
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lending’ is considerably influenced by the ownership structure of firms and banks, competition 
in firms and the legal environment.  
 More recently, Triki and Gajigo (2014) examined the nexus between reducing IA and 
financial access. Two main issues are investigated. (i) The effect of ISOs on financial access by 
firms and (ii) the impact of PCR design on financial access constraints. Their results show that 
(i) financial access is higher in nations with PCBs compared to those without ISOs or with PCRs 
and (ii) substantial cross-country variations exist in the design of PCRs and access to finance. 
Asongu et al. (2015) assessed reducing IA thresholds in financial development dynamics of size, 
activity, efficiency and depth. They found  negative effects from ISOs. Asongu et al. (2016a) 
subsequently investigated the impacts of ISOs by accounting for countries with low, intermediate 
and high levels of financial development.  It was reported that initial levels of access to finance 
are relevant for incremental effects of ISOs on financial development.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 We assess a sample of 53 African nations with data from African Development Indicators 
(ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank for the 
period 2004-2011. Data from the FDSD is available until 2011 while data on ISOs from ADI is 
only available from 2004. The scope of the inquiry on Africa is in accordance with the stylized 
facts and the literature review discussed in the preceding sections; especially a startling contrast 
between acute constraints in access to finance in the continent and little scholarly attention 
devoted to examining the financial development outcomes of reducing IA.  
 The propositions in Table 1 are computed from the FDSD. Two financial sector 
development indicators are employed.(i) formal financial development (Propositions 1 and 5) 
and (ii) informal financial development (Propositions 3 and 7). Semi-formal financial 
development (Propositions 2 and 6) is not used because of constraints on degrees of freedom, 
while non-formal financial development (Propositions 4 and 8) display a high degree of 
substitution with informal financial development. Consistent with African literature on reducing 
IA (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016a, 2016b), ISOs are measured with private credit 
bureaus (PCBs) and public credit registries (PCRs).  
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 Seven control variables are used to account for biases in omitted variables: two dummy 
variables and five non-dummy variables. The non-dummy variables include: public investment, 
inflation, GDP growth, foreign aid and trade openness. The choice of the variables is consistent 
with correlates of financial development (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 
2014b; Owosu & Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b; Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; 
Gossel & Biekpe, 2014). The dummy variables are income levels and legal origins. We discuss 
the expected signs.  
 First, investment has been documented as positively affecting financial development 
(Huang, 2011). Second, Do and Levchenko (2004) and Huang and Temple (2005) are in 
accordance with the proposition that trade openness is positively related to financial 
development. Third, both theoretical and empirical literature accord with the view that very high 
inflation is not conducive for activity and efficiency in the financial sector (see Huybens & 
Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001). Fourth, financial development is positively linked to economic 
growth because of inter alia, increased availability of productive investments and development 
in the banking industry (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Saint-Paul, 1992; Levine, 1997; Jaffee 
& Levonian, 2001). Fifth, from a theoretical standpoint, foreign aid is expected to augment 
financial development because it is anticipated that it will  narrow the saving-investment gap that 
countries in less developed countries are confronted (Easterly, 2005). From a practical 
perspective however, the incidence of development assistance is strongly contingent on the 
fraction of disbursed aid that finally reaches the country of destination. This is essentially 
because part of the aid may be spent in donor countries and/or siphoned off by authorities in 
recipient countries and ultimately deposited in tax havens that are within the jurisdictions of 
developed countries. Sixth, from both theoretical and empirical viewpoints, countries with 
English Common Law traditions are more likely to be associated with higher levels of financial 
development compared to their French Civil Law counterparts because of political and 
adaptability mechanisms (Beck et al., 2003).  The classification in legal origins is with the help 
of La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). Seventh, higher income countries in Africa enjoy higher levels 
of financial development, compared to lower income countries (Asongu, 2012). The evidence is 
in agreement with Jaffee and Levonian (2001) who have shown that high income countries enjoy 
more efficient banking system structures. Stratification of countries into income categories is in 
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accordance with Asongu (2014c, p. 364)9. It is relevant to note that these indicators in the 
conditioning information set could have different effects on informal and formal financial 
sectors. 
 The definition of variables, summary statistics and correlation matrix are provided in 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. From Appendix 1, it is apparent from 
values that the variables are comparable. Moreover, from corresponding variations or standard 
deviations we can be confident that reasonably estimated relationships would emerge. The 
objective of the correlation matrix is to reduce multicollinearity issues. While the issue is 
apparent between variables of financial sector development, fortunately it is not of major 
concern because they are employed exclusively as dependent variables. 
 
3.2 Estimation technique  
 Consistent in the motivation of this study, in order to control for existing levels of 
financial development in the assessment of the linkage between reducing IA and financial sector 
development, we employ quantile regressions (QR). This estimation technique enables the 
examination of determinants of financial sector development throughout the conditional 
distributions of financial sector development (Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; 
Okada & Samreth, 2012). In other words, specific emphasis is laid on countries with low, 
intermediate and high levels of financial sector development.  
 Existing literature on reducing IA has investigated the linkage between ISOs and 
financial development by reporting estimated parameters at the conditional mean of financial 
development (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016b). Whereas mean impacts are 
relevant, the present inquiry complements the underlying strand of the literature by employing a 
QR estimation strategy that accounts for existing levels of financial development. In addition, 
while with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, estimations are based on the hypothesis of 
normally distributed error terms, the assumption of such normality is not consistent with the QR 
strategy.  
 With the QR estimation strategy, regressors are estimated at various points of the 
conditional distribution of financial sector development. Therefore, the technique is in 
                                                          
9
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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accordance with the motivation of accounting for low-, intermediate- and high-levels of financial 
sector development. The policy relevance of the approach is founded on the  assumption that 
“one size fits all”  policies on the role of reducing IA in financial sector development may not be 
ineffective unless they are based on existing levels of financial sector development and hence 
tailored differently across countries with differing initial levels of development in the financial 
sector.  
The  th quantile estimator of a financial sector dynamic is obtained by solving for the 
optimization problem in Eq (1), which is disclosed without subscripts for ease of presentation 
and simplicity.  























 ,                                              (1) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For instance 
the 10th or 90th deciles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) are calculated by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of financial development or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of financial development. For the model in Eq (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is a financial development indicator while ix  contains a constant term, 
foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public investment, inflation, middle income and Common law.  
The specifications are tailored to control for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of fixed 










4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Presentation results  
 Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present results corresponding to formal financial 
development and informal financial development. Whereas the left-hand-side (LHS) of tables 
discloses contemporary estimations, the right-hand-side (RHS) shows non-contemporary 
regressions. The purpose of lagging the independent variables on the RHS by one year so as to  
correct for endogeneity (see Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 21). We observe consistent variations in 
estimated coefficients of ISO between OLS and QR estimates. These differences which are in 
terms of signs, significance and magnitude of estimated coefficients, justify the choice of 
modelling at various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variables.  
 In Table 2, Panel A presents findings of formal financial sector development whereas 
Panel B discloses results of financial sector formalization. The following findings can be 
established. First, with the exception of PCBs in the 90th decile for which the effect is negative, 
ISOs consistently increase formal financial development, with the incidence of PCRs higher in 
terms of magnitude. Second, ISO consistently increase financial sector formalization with the 
impact of PCBs higher for the most part. Third, most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
The following findings can be recognised from Table 3 on linkages between ISOs and 
informal finance. First, only PCBs significantly lessen informal financial development.  Second, 
both ISO measurements decrease financial sector informalization. Third, the control variables are 
significant with expected signs. It is important to note that, it is normal that the results in Table 2 
contradict those in Table 3. This is essentially because the former deals with formal whereas the 
latter deals with informal financial development. As discussed in the propositions in Table 1, 
both financial sectors are in competition for money supply. Hence, the increase in money supply 










Table 2: Formal Financial Development and Information Asymmetry   
             
 Formal Financial Development   
 Panel A: Formal Financial Sector Development (Prop.1) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  21.851*** 7.337** 10.644*** 7.582*** 18.992*** 38.727*** 22.793*** 6.841** 12.341*** 8.385*** 19.502*** 38.911*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.343*** 0.437*** 1.607*** 1.380*** 1.794*** 0.494*** 1.434*** 1.146*** 1.573*** 1.818*** 1.693*** 0.757*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.343*** 0.400*** 0.453*** 0.400*** 0.506*** -0.207** -0.229 0.434*** 0.450*** 0.492*** 0.484*** -0.213** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.280) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) 
GDP growth  -0.289 -0.079 -0.101 -0.482*** -0.530*** -0.256 -0.029 -0.043 -0.165 -0.537*** -0.485** -0.161 
 (0.134) (0.608) (0.449) (0.000) (0.001) (0.254) (0.170) (0.786) (0.463) (0.000) (0.014) (0.311) 
Inflation -0.010 0.024** 0.019 -0.012 -0.031 -0.063*** 0.227 0.022** 0.013 -0.032** -0.053** -0.091*** 
 (0.484) (0.018) (0.121) (0.373) (0.111) (0.005) (0.405) (0.049) (0.552) (0.016) (0.014) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.244 0.161 -0.016 0.774*** 1.174*** 0.713*** -0.175 0.040 -0.065 0.693*** 1.004*** 0.593*** 
 (0.316) (0.488) (0.882) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) (0.719) (0.796) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.105 0.077 0.218** 0.097 -0.242 -0.593*** -0.062 0.051 0.145 0.067 -0.249 -0.620*** 
 (0.429) (0.490) (0.015) (0.174) (0.103) (0.003) (0.100) (0.644) (0.319) (0.471) (0.170) (0.000) 
Trade  -0.068* -0.048* 0.053** 0.049*** -0.001 -0.061* 9.907*** -0.029 -0.043 0.063*** 0.019 -0.031 
 (0.058) (0.086) (0.011) (0.003) (0.964) (0.065) (0.000) (0.299) (0.239) (0.005) (0.563) (0.364) 
Middle Income 10.266*** 2.225 3.830** 1.909 2.923 37.291*** 2.742 1.864 2.756 0.202 2.808 34.505*** 
 (0.000) (0.214) (0.010) (0.125) (0.195) (0.000) (0.260) (0.273) (0.286) (0.904) (0.317) (0.000) 
Common Law 2.003 3.368** 1.698 3.580*** 2.718 2.031 22.793*** 4.416*** 2.174 5.012*** 3.129 3.275 
 (0.376) (0.013) (0.152) (0.001) (0.162) (0.483) (0.000) (0.002) (0.298) (0.000) (0.212) (0.259) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.362 0.180 0.166 0.234 0.305 0.400 0.361 0.185 0.171 0.243 0.299 0.394 
Fisher  30.21***      26.83***      
Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial Sector Formalization (Prop.5) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  0.629*** 0.409*** 0.550*** 0.639*** 0.712*** 0.770*** 0.635*** 0.393*** 0.573*** 0.656*** 0.712*** 0.754*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.002** 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.002) (0.016) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.019) (0.121) (0.013) 
PCB 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0..009*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.001 -0.0004 0.002 0.004*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.001 -0.0003 0.004 0.004*** 0.002** 0.0003 
 (0.611) (0.857) (0.529) (0.000) (0.151) (0.000) (0.600) (0.904) (0.288) (0.001) (0.041) (0.581) 
Inflation 0.0003** 0.0009*** 0.0004** 0.0001 -0.00003 -0.0001** 0.0003 0.001*** 0.0002 0.0001 -0.00008 0.001*** 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.026) (0.328) (0.772) (0.036) (0.140) (0.000) (0.323) (0.484) (0.722) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006* 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.061) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0001 0.001 0.005** -0.0008 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.221) (0.007) (0.594) (0.510) (0.452) (0.901) (0.286) (0.016) (0.718) (0.905) (0.547) (0.398) 
Trade  -0.0005** -0.0007* -0.00008 -0.00001 -0.0001 0.006*** -0.0005* -0.0007 -0.0001 0.00003 -0.00009 0.00004 
 (0.014) (0.064) (0.856) (0.926) (0.552) (0.000) (0.060) (0.176) (0.771) (0.870) (0.642) (0.738) 
Middle Income 0.089*** 0.184*** 0.058 0.069*** 0.062*** -0.0001 0.087*** 0.198*** 0.050 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.000) (0.001) (0.901) (0.000) (0.000) (0.239) (0.000) (0.001) (0.134) 
Common Law 0.089*** 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.067*** -0.00009 0.090*** 0.059** 0.112*** 0.083*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.557) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.525 0.314 0.245 0.278 0.328 0.471 0.525 0.317 0.237 0.278 0.333 0.478 
Fisher  21.03***      17.01***      
Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDP: Gross 
Domestic Product. Invt: Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 








Table 3: Informal Financial Development and Information Asymmetry   
             
 Informal Financial Development   
 Panel A: Informal Financial Sector Development (Prop. 3) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  9.450*** 4.536*** 5.708*** 9.107*** 12.388*** 16.472*** 9.463*** 1.438 5.805*** 9.362*** 11.989*** 17.248*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.009 0.062 0.059* 0.028 0.002 -0.071** 0.012 0.089 0.084 0.031 0.015 -0.043 
 (0.731) (0.129) (0.068) (0.126) (0.960) (0.049) (0.665) (0.149) (0.188) (0.157) (0.550) (0.305) 
PCB -0.180*** -0.340*** -0.227*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.153*** -0.186*** -0.343*** -0.252*** -0.098*** -0.084*** -0.136*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.156*** -0.030 -0.145*** -0.072*** -0.145*** -0.203*** -0.127** -0.121 -0.147* -0.078*** -0.145*** -0.175*** 

























 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.140*** -0.235*** -0.086** -0.100*** -0.042 -0.113* -0.169*** -0.106* -0.128** -0.167*** -0.070* -0.148** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.372) (0.053) (0.001) (0.091) (0.047) (0.000) (0.054) (0.019) 
Foreign Aid  -0.076*** -0.038 -0.031 -0.052*** -0.108*** -0.173*** -0.076*** 0.028 -0.027 -0.051*** -0.081*** -0.161*** 
 (0.006) (0.334) (0.270) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006) (0.588) (0.550) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) 
Trade  0.004 0.012 0.013** -0.007** -0.016* -0.026*** 0.004 0.025* 0.018* -0.005 -0.014** -0.043*** 
 (0.565) (0.256) (0.027) (0.048) (0.063) (0.006) (0.613) (0.051) (0.074) (0.229) (0.036) (0.000) 
Middle Income 0.459 -0.963 -1.415*** 0.982*** 0.477 1.966** 0.513 -0.035 -1.653** 1.060*** 0.317 2.225** 
 (0.385) (0.176) (0.003) (0.001) (0.483) (0.032) (0.378) (0.967) (0.030) (0.002) (0.523) (0.023) 
Common Law -2.650*** -0.963** -1.089*** -3.082*** -3.693*** -3.240*** -2.934*** -1.055 -1.484** -3.143*** -3.600*** -3.667*** 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.131) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.403 0.377 0.217 0.250 0.243 0.232 0.427 0.376 0.225 0.262 0.262 0.267 
Fisher  28.75***      26.95***      
Observations  308 308 308 308 308 308 274 274 274 274 274 274 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial Sector Informalization (Prop. 7) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  0.365*** 0.201*** 0.270*** 0.359*** 0.468*** 0.643*** 0.358*** 0.202*** 0.260*** 0.344*** 0.446*** 0.626*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR -0.004*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003* -0.005 -0.004*** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004* -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.003) (0.093) (0.106) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.002) (0.069) (0.000) 
PCB -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.0007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0007 0.00007 -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.752) (0.152) (0.188) (0.009) (0.906) (0.864) (0.777) (0.948) (0.000) (0.007) (0.874) (0.908) 
Inflation -
0.0006*** 







 (0.000) (0.277) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.003** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.025) (0.011) 
Foreign Aid  -0.001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006** -0.001 0.001 0.0007 -0.00005 -0.002 -0.006** 
 (0.193) (0.233) (0.884) (0.149) (0.281) (0.015) (0.251) (0.287) (0.153) (0.960) (0.174) (0.028) 
Trade  0.0005** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.00009 -0.00005 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001 -0.00003 0.0006 
 (0.041) (0.478) (0.395) (0.670) (0.891) (0.561) (0.059) (0.500) (0.086) (0.615) (0.926) (0.347) 
Middle Income -0.081*** -0.007 -0.048*** -0.055*** -0.054 -0.153*** -0.080*** -0.007 -0.039*** -0.057*** -0.040 -0.179*** 
 (0.000) (0.659) (0.002) (0.002) (0.120) (0.002) (0.000) (0.740) (0.000) (0.004) (0.232) (0.001) 
Common Law -0.100*** -0.054*** -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.122*** -0.118*** -0.101*** -0.052*** -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.125*** -0.082** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.516 0.439 0.309 0.271 0.263 0.317 0.517 0.444 0.316 0.270 0.257 0.314 
Fisher  20.07***      16.18***      
Observations  293 293 293 293 293 293 257 257 257 257 257 257 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDP: Gross 
Domestic Product. Invt: Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 
0.1) signify nations financial sector development is least.  
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4.2 Further discussion of the results and policy implications 
 
 The results are further discussed in four main strands, namely: alignment of the findings 
with theoretical underpinnings and the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (QLH); comparative effects of 
ISOs; quasi-theoretical contributions and nexus with existing literature.  
 First, it is important to note that the signs of estimated coefficients are consistent with the 
theoretical underpinnings for the most part. Accordingly, ISOs are expected to stimulate 
development within the financial sector in order to enhance lending. Such development is 
boosted by (i) rendering credit markets contestable and (ii) reducing informational rents. The 
consistent positive (negative) effect of ISOs on formal (informal) financial development is in line 
with theory. The expected signs are traceable to the fact that, in addition to sharing information, 
ISOs also play the role of a disciplining device by discouraging borrowers from resorting to the 
informal financial sector as a viable alternative to the formal financial sector. It is important to 
note that the positive correlation between ISO and formal financial development is not a 
sufficient condition for financial allocation efficiency because formal financial development may 
also be the result of increasing financial system deposits or liquid liabilities. As a policy 
implication, it is important to consolidate the positive link between formal financial development 
and ISOs with appropriate mechanisms by which financial access and financial intermediary 
efficiency can be improved. These complementary measures are needed to mitigate the 
substantially documented excess liquidity concerns in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 
2006; Fouda, 2009).  
From the alignment of the findings with theoretical underpinnings, we may indirectly 
argue for conditions for the non-acceptance of the QLH10. The articulation of ‘conditions for 
non-acceptance’ is consistent with the narrative of the previous paragraph, notably that this 
inquiry is not positioned on directly investigating the QLH. At least for now, we can firmly 
establish that the introduction of ISOs in Africa as a means of addressing a significant challenge 
to doing business on the continent is having promising and encouraging effects because of 
positive benefits towards formal financial development. It is important to note that the African 
business literature is consistent with the view that the lack of internal sources of finance is a 
major constraint in doing business on the continent (see Darley, 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; 
Tuomi, 2011; Bartels et al., 2009).  
                                                          
10
 The QLH has been defined and discussed in the introduction.   
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 Second, on the comparative dimension of the findings, it is important to note that the 
effect of PCRs is not significant in reducing informal financial development. This is not the case 
with PCBs which consistently display the expected signs across panels and distributions of 
dependent variables. The importance of PCBs may be traceable to its six distinctive features. The 
comprise purpose, coverage, status, ownership, data sources used and terms of access. (1) While 
PCRs consist of public institutions that are created with the fundamental role of supervising the 
banking sector, PCBs arise because of demand for, and need of market information by 
borrowers. (2) Whereas the coverage of PCRs is substantially provided by large enterprises and 
restricted with regards to the nature of data, PCBs go beyond big enterprises to include data from 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that is rich with longer histories. (3) PCRs are not for 
profit whereas PCBs are essentially profit-making. (4) PCRs belong to central banks and 
governments while the propriety of PCBs include lending associations and other independent 
parties. (5) While information employed by PCRs is obtained from both non-bank and bank 
activities, that employed by PCBs includes sources of PCRs, tax authorities and courts. (6) PCBs 
(PCRs) access is open to all lender types (limited to information providers). It is apparent from 
the above clarifications that the superiority of PCBs have in reducing informal financial 
development may be linked to, inter alia, performance incentives and sources of data.  
 Third, the quasi-theoretical contribution of the study to the existing literature is apparent 
from the effect of PCRs in informal financial development compared to the corresponding 
impact on financial informalization. Whereas PCRs decrease financial informalization, it has no 
effect on informal financial development. A direct implication is that PCRs have some influence 
in reducing the money supply share of the informal financial sector, but have no significant 
influence in negatively affecting the GDP share of the informal financial sector. As an 
implication, non-monetary informal factors in the economic sector are not influenced by PCRs. 
The inference articulates the theoretical contribution of hitherto unexplored financial sector 
development indicators which this study has employed. It also substantiates the relevance of 
using unfamiliar indicators by this study to unite two streams of research11.  
Fourth, we compare the findings with the engaged literature in Section 2 (1) The findings 
are in line with those of Singh et al. (2009) who reported that African countries with ISOs have 
                                                          
11
 For brevity and the purpose of avoiding repetition, we invite the interested reader to consult the introductory and 
concluding sections for insights into how this contribution unites these two streams of development research.  
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high levels of formal financial development. Our findings also accord with Galindo and Miller 
(2001) from the insight that nations with comparatively enhanced ISOs are associated with fewer 
restrictions in financial access or more formal financial development. (2) While the findings do 
not confirm the results of Asongu et al (2016b) who found that the positive ISO-finance nexus is 
exclusively apparent when financial development is measured with financial size (deposit bank 
assets on total assets), they align with Asongu et al. (2016a) in financial development dynamics 
of depth, efficiency, activity and size.  (3) Love and Mylenko (2003) reported that PCBs are 
linked to lower constraints in access to finance whereas PCRs do not exert any significant effect. 
While our findings confirm the superiority of PCBs in reducing informal financial development, 
the role of PCRs is not confirmed because they increase formal financial development and 
financial development formalization. Moreover, PCRs also decrease financial informalization 
and there is a higher positive magnitude from PCRs in formal financial development. (4) The 
comparative narrative of the findings with respect to the results of Love and Mylenko (2003) 
also applies to the findings Triki and Gajigo (2014) who have concluded that access to finance is 
on average terms higher in countries with PCBs, relative to those with PCRs or no ISOs.  
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the role of reducing information asymmetry (IA) 
on conditional financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011.  
The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. 
The policy relevance of this approach is founded on the assumption that blanket policies on the 
role of reducing IA on financial sector development may be ineffective unless they are based on 
existing levels of financial sector development and tailored differently across countries with 
differing initial levels of financial sector development. Instruments of reducing IA include credit 
registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial 
sector development are engaged, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, 
informalization, semi-formalization and non-formalization.  
 The following findings are established. First, with the exception of PCBs in the 90th 
decile for which the effect is negative, information sharing offices (ISOs) consistently increase 
formal financial development, with the incidence of PCRs higher in terms of magnitude. Second, 
ISOs consistently increase financial sector formalization, with the impact of PCBs higher for the 
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most part. Third, only PCBs significantly decrease informal financial development and both 
ISOs decrease financial sector informalization. Policy implications have been discussed.  
The introduction of the notion of financialization unites two strands of research by (i) 
responding to a growing field of economic development on microfinance and informal finance 
and (ii) contributing to the stream of studies on the measurement of financial development. In 
addition, the paper suggests a pragmatic means of disentangling the effect of decreasing 
information asymmetry on various components of the financial sector. Thus, the study engages 
hitherto unexplored financial sector concepts, namely: formalization, semi-formalization, 
informalization and non-formalization. Policy implications have been discussed. 
There is evidently room for complementing these findings by investigating information 
and communication technology (ICT) mechanisms by which the established linkages can be 
enhanced or weakened. This recommendation for future research is based on the intuition that 
the quality of information sharing mechanisms is relevant for the effectiveness of ISOs in their 
role of reducing IA. Moreover the positive connection between ISOs and formal financial 
development is not a sufficient condition for financial allocation efficiency because formal 
financial development may be the result of increasing financial system deposits or liquid 





























Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
  







Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) 28.037 20.970 2.926 92.325 377 
Semi-formal Financial Development (Prop. 2) 0.199 0.715 0.000 4.478 424 
Informal Financial Development (Prop. 3) 5.350 5.106 -18.89 25.674 424 
Non-formal Financial Development (Prop. 4) 5.550 5.171 -18.89 25.674 424 
Financial Formalization (Prop. 5) 0.773 0.168 0.235 1.469 377 
Financial Semi-formalization (Prop. 6) 0.007 0.029 0.000 0.244 377 
Financial Informalization (Prop. 7) 0.219 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
Financia Non-formalization (Prop. 8) 0.226 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
  
     
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0.000 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0.000 64.8 380 




Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       













Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 293) 
     
       
Financial Sector Development Info. Asymmetry Control Variables  
Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.110 0.127 0.142 0.565 -0.052 -0.556 -0.565 0.411 0.310 -0.094 -0.071 0.058 -0.311 0.141 Prop.1 
 1.000 -0.013 0.130 -0.031 0.872 -0.128 0.031 -0.023 -0.100 -0.060 0.260 -0.040 0.007 -0.086 Prop.2 
  1.000 0.989 -0.604 -0.068 0.617 0.604 0.127 -0.569 -0.083 -0.082 -0.054 0.033 -0.006 Prop.3 
   1.000 -0.604 0.057 0.593 0.604 0.123 -0.579 -0.091 -0.044 -0.059 0.034 -0.018 Prop.4 
    1.000 -0.092 -0.983 -1.000 0.094 0.613 -0.004 0.008 0.128 -0.246 0.119 Prop.5 
     1.000 -0.091 0.092 -0.059 -0.084 -0.077 0.289 -0.012 0.123 -0.074 Prop.6 
      1.000 0.983 -0.083 -0.598 0.018 -0.061 -0.125 0.224 -0.105 Prop.7 
       1.000 -0.094 -0.613 0.004 -0.008 -0.128 0.246 -0.119 Prop.8 
        1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 PCR 
         1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 PCB 
          1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg 
           1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 Inflation  
            1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt 
             1.000 -0.309 NODA 
              1.000 Trade 
                
Info: Information. Prop.1: Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.2: Semi-Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.3: Informal Financial Sector Development. Prop. 4: Non-Formal Financial 
Development. Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop.6: Financial Sector Semi-Formalization. Prop.7: Financial Sector Informalization. Prop.8: Financial Sector Non-Formalization. PCR: Public 
Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. I  
 
        




















Appendix 3: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of Variables  Sources 
Formal Financial 
Development  
Prop.1 Bank deposits/GDP. Bank deposits here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money banks (Lines 24 and 25 







   
Semi-formal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 
  (Financial deposits – Bank deposits)/ GDP.    Financial 
deposits are demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions. (Lines 24, 25 
and 45 of IFS, October, 2008). 
   
Informal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/GDP 
   
Informal and semi-formal 
financial development  
Prop.4 (Money  Supply –  Bank deposits)/GDP 
   
Financial intermediary 
formalization 
Prop.5 Bank deposits/ Money Supply (M2). From ‘informal and 
semi-formal’ to formal financial development (formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization’ 
Prop.6 (Financial deposits - Bank deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal financial development 
(Semi-formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
Prop.7 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal financial development 
(Informalisation). 




Prop.8 (Money Supply – Bank Deposits)/Money Supply.  Formal to 
‘informal and semi-formal’ financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization). 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
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